Counterfactual imaginings are known to have far reaching implications. In the present experiment, we ask if imagining events from one's past can affect memory for childhood events. We draw on the social psychology literature showing that imagining a future event increases the subjective likelihood that the event will occur. The concepts of cognitive availability and the source monitoring framework provide reasons to expect that imagination may inflate confidence that a childhood event occurred. However, people routinely produce myriad counterfactual imaginings (i.e., (...) daydreams and fantasies) but usually do not confuse them with past experiences. To determine the effects of imagining a childhood event, we pretested subjects on how confident they were that a number of childhood events had happened, asked them to imagine some of those events, and then gathered new confidence measures. For each of the target items, imagination inflated confidence that the event had occurred in childhood. We discuss implications for situations in which imagination is used as an aid in searching for presumably lost memories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ralegh and the Punic WarsCharles G. Salas“For he doth not feign, that rehearseth probabilities as bare conjectures....”Sir Walter Ralegh, The History of the WorldThe Secret HistoryIn 1603 Sir Walter Ralegh was judged guilty of treason and imprisoned in the Tower of London to await execution. The wait was a long one —execution did not take place until 1618—giving this artful courtier, warrior, poet, and poseur time to script new (...) roles for himself. The most memorable of these was historian, and the stage on which he performed was the entire world. Universal history had been a time-honored genre in England, but never had there been so remarkable a performance by a native son as Ralegh’s The History of the World (1614). In five books Ralegh offered to king and country his interpretation of events from Creation to 168 bc. Book V, last and lengthiest of the entire work, deals in large part with the struggle between Rome and Carthage. The story of that struggle is Ralegh’s most mature historical writing and the most revealing of himself, for when he gave up his plan to carry his history into modern times, the Punic Wars became the context for things about the present that he was loath to leave unsaid.Despite its length (about a million words) and premature ending, the History was an enormous success with a public eager to possess the meaning of it all. Oliver Cromwell particularly liked the way it followed “the strange windings and turnings of Providence”; 1 no doubt he found Ralegh’s emphasis upon the Providential control of events reassuring. For Ralegh claimed to show how “kings and kingdoms have flourished and fallen, and for what virtue and piety God made prosperous, and for what vice and deformity he made wretched both the one and the other.” 2 In fact what Ralegh showcased [End Page 195] were the acts of a vengeful, Old Testament God more concerned with punishing monarchical sins than with making monarchs prosperous, and the History was temporarily suppressed by James for being “too saucy in censoring princes.” 3If the king did not like what he saw in the History, the king’s critics did; and Ralegh, never a friend to Puritan or republican in his lifetime, became a hero to both as a pious author and victim of Stuart tyranny. Those sympathetic to the Stuarts, like Alexander Ross, Chaplain to Charles I, saw Ralegh rather differently; but the popularity of the man and his History could not be denied. Ross himself profited from that popularity by doing both an abridgment and a continuation of the History as well as Som Animadversions and Observations upon Sir Walter Raleigh’s Historie of the World. Wherein his mistakes are noted, and som doubtful passages cleered (1653). Many of these animadversions were directed at Ralegh’s treatment of the Punic Wars. Ross recognized that “mistakes” and “doubtful passages” there formed a pattern: “Sir Walter cannot look upon the Roman Glorie with but a squint eye”(8), he complained. But did he also recognize the reason for that squint eye, that Ralegh kept one eye on the past and the other on the present? That many of those “doubtful passages” were in fact strategic elements in a campaign (based on parallels) against Rome, against James, and against James’s ministry? Had this been obvious to Ross, he still would not have said so. Writing under Cromwell, he could no more afford to complain explicitly about abuse of James than Ralegh, writing under James, could afford to make the abuse explicit.Parallels—implicit or imagined—are part and parcel of Ralegh’s providentialism. In brief: God controls events, God does not change, events do not change. This is not to say that Ralegh believed that God’s control was transparent, that God couldn’t change, or that free will did not exist. Ralegh did not solve the great problems of theology. 4 What he is sure about is that the same sins continue to be punished just as they have always been: “So also hath God punished the same and the like sins in all after-times, and... (shrink)

In his book The descent of man , Charles Darwin paid tribute to a trio of writers who offered naturalistic explanations of the origin of language. Darwin’s concurrence with these figures was limited, however, because each of them denied some aspect of his thesis that the evolution of language had been coeval with and essential to the emergence of humanity’s characteristic mental traits. Darwin first sketched out this thesis in his theoretical notebooks of the 1830s and then clarified his (...) position in Descent, where he argued that mind–language coevolution had occurred prior to the rise of distinct racial groups. He thus opposed the view of August Schleicher and Ernst Haeckel, who taught that speech had originated subsequent to the geographical and racial dispersion of humanity’s ancestors. As Darwin argued in Descent, this quasi-polygenetic version of coevolution was unable to explain primeval man’s initial dominance over rival ape-like populations. Drawing inspiration from British anthropologists, Darwin made the early development of language, hence mental monogenesis, central to his account of human evolution. (shrink)

Collingwood's attitude toward literary sources is related to the method of selective excavation. But as an excavator, Collingwood came in for some criticism from his fellow archaeologists. Collingwood's treatment of four historical problems is considered: why Caesar invaded Britain, why Augustus did not, how the Claudian conquest proceeded, and why Hadrian built his wall and vallum. Collingwood concluded that Caesar intended to conquer, Augustus did not, and that the vallum served a civil rather than military purpose. In trying to identify (...) past thought Collingwood approaches literary sources and archaeological remains with particular questions in mind. Questions and answers being correlative, this often amounts to having made up his mind in advance. When he comes to the evidence itself, he sees what he expects to see ; occasionally what he sees is not in fact there. Where Collingwood creates a history, Peter Salway sometimes seems to be summarizing a subject. With Collingwood, however, we more than participate in processes of thought, we actually see the connections. Collingwood makes the real rational, and no historian of Roman Britain has done that better. (shrink)

In recent years, Charles Sanders Peirce has emerged, in the eyes of philosophers both in America and abroad, as one of America’s major philosophical thinkers. His work has forced us back to philosophical reflection about those basic issues that inevitably confront us as human beings, especially in an age of science. Peirce’s concern for experience, for what is actually encountered, means that his philosophy, even in its most technical aspects, forms a reflective commentary on actual life and on the (...) world in which it is lived. In Charles S. Peirce: On Norms and Ideals, Potter argues that Peirce’s doctrine of the normative sciences is essential to his pragmatism. No part of Peirce’s philosophy is bolder than his attempt to establish esthetics, ethics, and logic as the three normative sciences and to argue for the priority of esthetics among the trio. Logic, Potter cites, is normative because it governs thought and aims at truth; ethics is normative because it analyzes the ends to which thought should be directed; esthetics is normative and fundamental because it considers what it means to be an end of something good in itself. This study shows that pierce took seriously the trinity of normative sciences and demonstrates that these categories apply both to the conduct of man and to the workings of the cosmos. Professor Potter combines sympathetic and informed exposition with straightforward criticism and he deals in a sensible manner with the gaps and inconsistencies in Peirce’s thought. His study shows that Peirce was above all a cosmological and ontological thinker, one who combined science both as a method and as result with a conception of reasonable actions to form a comprehensive theory of reality. Peirce’s pragmatism, although it has to do with "action and the achievement of results, is not a glorification of action but rather a theory of the dynamic nature of things in which the "ideal" dimension of reality – laws, nature of things, tendencies, and ends – has genuine power for directing the cosmic order, including man, toward reasonable goals. (shrink)

"My experience is what I agree to attend to," wrote William James (1890) nearly a century ago in his Principles of Psychology. Although certainly not the first to recognize the importance of attention in man's experience--poets and philosophers throughout history have touched upon the concept in one way or another-James deserves credit for having accorded attention a central role in the systematic study of the mind. With the advancement of psychology since that time, except during the behaviorist digression, the concept (...) of attention has been an integral part of many prominent theories dealing with learning, thinking, and other aspects of cognitive functioning. Indeed, attention is an important determinant of experience from birth throughout development. This has been an implicit assumption underlying our view of cognition since the writings of Charles Darwin (1897) and Wilhelm Preyer (1888) as well as James, all of whom offered provocative insights about the developing child's commerce with the environment. Al though systematic research on attention in children was slow to pick up during the early part of this century, interest in the developmental study of attention has expanded enormously in recent years. (shrink)

Ethical self-management; an introduction to systematic personality psychology, by M. C. Katz.--Four axiological proofs of the infinite value of man, by R. S. Hartman.--Some thoughts regarding the current philosophy of the behavioral sciences, by C. R. Rogers.--Autonomy and community, by D. Lee.--Synergy in the society and in the individual, by A. H. Maslow.--Human nature: its cause and effect; a theoretical framework for understanding human motivation, by M. C. Katz.--Mental health; a generic attitude, by G. W. Allport.--Love feelings in courtship couples; (...) an analysis, by R. P. Hattis.--Economic policies and human well-being, by W. A. Weisskopf.--The great transformation, by H. F. W. Perk.--Contingencies of reinforcement in the design of a culture, by B. F. Skinner.--For further reading. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION* Historians of philosophy seem increasingly to agree with the view that David Hume is the greatest philosopher ever to have written in English. This high esteem of the Scottish empiricist, however, is a phenomenon of the last decades. As late as 1925 Charles W. Hendel could write "that Hume is no longer a living figure." And Stuart Hampshire reports that in the Oxford of (...) the Thirties the results of Humean philosophizing were regarded as "extravagances of 2 scepticism which no one could seriously accept." A cursory glance at the Hume bibliography edited by Roland Hall demonstrates that it has become standard practice in the English-speaking world to seek an understanding of Hume's arguments when analysing philosophical problems. Critical literature nevertheless continues to neglect the majority of his arguments. It is sufficient, I think, to mention Hume's remarks on space and time, his theory of emotions, his inquiries into the problem of justice, his economic writings and those on the psychology of roliqion. Dut 3 even in the frequently quoted passages of the Treatise Hume's central notion is not, in my opinion, at the heart of the analysis. Here I refer to Hume's remarks on the phenomenon of imagination (fancy). Although he mentions this curious faculty of our cognition on almost every page, there are only a few sporadic attempts at an interpretation of this "supreme Humean faculty." This may be due to the fact that until quite recently the 'problem of imagination' has hardly even belonged to the marginal topics of modern philosophy. This paper therefore attempts to demonstrate not only that Hume dealt with the phenomenon of imagination, but also that an analysis of this concept is of paramount significance for the understanding of his entire philosophy. In the first three sections three different faculties or functions of the imagination will be distinguished. Not only the artist's - 91 92. works, but also the insights of the scientist and the illusions of metaphysicians are, according to Hume, decisively based on this very cognitive faculty. Section 4 contains a brief discussion of the sceptical arguments of the Treatise, particularly of the Humean analysis of causation. Their impact on Hume's reflections on the problem of imagination is the topic of Section 5. I hope to prove that in the Enquiry Hume interprets these sceptical arguments differently than in the Treatise. While in his early work he feels himself exposed to Pyrrhonian doubts, he assumes the position of an 'academic sceptic' in the Enquiry. The concluding section eventually tries to determine which motives may have been decisive for Hume's change of opinion. I shall defend the thesis that in his late work Hume developed an 'ethics of belief on the basis of natural beliefs, in which the artistic capacity of the imagination assumes a decisive role in justifying philosophical and scientific propositions. 1. The Metaphysical Faculty of the Imagination In the Introduction to the Treatise Hume describes his endeavour as developing a propaedeutic basic science which should provide a better understanding of all products of the human mind (science, mathematics, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, politics). In the Abstract he calls his early work "a system of the sciences" (?7). Besides this empirical interest Hume saw the importance of justifying the choice of method, i.e. to extoll the experimental procedure as the only rational one. Metaphysical approaches are interpreted as products of a blind imagination. Beginning with the Introduction to the Treatise it has been a constant motive of Hume's philosophy to constrain metaphysics in order to make way for science. In the sections Of the effects of other relations and other habite (T106-117), Of unphilosophiaal probability 93. (T143-155), Of scepticism with regard to the senses (T187218 ), Of the antient philosophy (T219-225) Hume specifies those beliefs which, in his opinion, are based on figments of our imagination. He "had ^en that all the errors of philosophy arose from the fact that imagination determined men much more than they recognized - there could be no secure truth for him, then, until he had explored this aspect of the nature of man." He compares imagination to a ship which, having... (shrink)

We show that the implicational fragment of intuitionism is the weakest logic with a non-trivial probabilistic semantics which satisfies the thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. We also show that several logics between intuitionism and classical logic also admit non-trivial probability functions which satisfy that thesis. On the other hand, we also prove that very weak assumptions concerning negation added to the core probability conditions with the restriction that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities are sufficient to (...) trivialize the semantics. (shrink)

In Charles S. Peirce: On Norms and Ideals, Potter argues that Peirce's doctrine of the normative sciences is essential to his pragmatism. No part of Peirce's philosophy is bolder than his attempt to establish esthetics, ethics, and logic as the three normative sciences and to argue for the priority of esthetics among the trio. Logic, Potter cites, is normative because it governs thought and aims at truth; ethics is normative because it analyzes the ends to which thought should be (...) directed; esthetics is normative and fundamental because it considers what it means to be an end or something good in itself. This study shows that Peirce took seriously the trinity of normative sciences and demonstrates that these categories apply both to the conduct of man and to the workings of the cosmos. (shrink)

In [2] Hempel and Oppenheim give a definition of “explanation” for a certain formal language. In [1] Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague prove five theorems demonstrating that the Hempel and Oppenheim definition is not restrictive enough. In [3] Kim proposes two further conditions to supplement the Hempel and Oppenheim definition in order to avoid the objections posed in [1]. In this paper it is shown that the definition of Hempel and Oppenheim supplemented by Kim's conditions is open to a trivialization very (...) analogous to that given in [1]. (shrink)

The eight papers in this collection, which were delivered at the Fourth Annual Conference in Philosophy at the University of Georgia in February, 1971, deal with a variety of topics related to the current controversy about man’s use of his environment. The contributors, Eugene P. Odum, William T. Blackstone, Joel Feinberg, Charles Hartshorne, Walter O’Briant, Nicholas Rescher, Robert G. Burton, and Pete A. Y. Gunter, discuss such issues as overpopulation, man’s relation to nature, man’s attitude toward his environment, and (...) the proper role of technology in industrialized societies. Two especially interesting papers are Rescher’s "The Environmental Crisis and the Quality of Life" and Feinberg’s "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations." Rescher believes that Americans can avoid bitter disappointment only by realizing that no significant improvement in the quality of their environment is possible. He is aware that this realization will be painful because it involves surrendering the deeply held convictions that the quality of our life will continually improve and that our technology can overcome any physical obstacles. Feinberg discusses some of the complex issues involved in deciding whether people are obligated to leave a satisfactory environment for those who will come in the future. He contends that there is no obligation to add additional people; but, insofar as it is known that there will be future generations, we are obligated to consider their interests. The book has a helpful introduction by the editor which summarizes the position and arguments of each contributor.—M.G. (shrink)

This essay traces the interlinked origins of two concepts found in Charles Darwin's writings: "unconscious selection," and sexual selection as applied to humanity's anatomical race distinctions. Unconscious selection constituted a significant elaboration of Darwin's artificial selection analogy. As originally conceived in his theoretical notebooks, that analogy had focused exclusively on what Darwin later would call "methodical selection," the calculated production of desired changes in domestic breeds. By contrast, unconscious selection produced its results unintentionally and at a much slower pace. (...) Inspiration for this concept likely came from Darwin's early reading of works on both animal breeding and physical ethnology. Texts in these fields described the slow and unplanned divergence of anatomical types, whether animal or human, under the guidance of contrasting ideals of physical perfection. These readings, it is argued, also led Darwin to his theory of sexual selection as applied to race, a theme he discussed mainly in his book The Descent of Man. There Darwin described how the racial version of sexual selection operated on the same principle as unconscious selection. He thereby effectively reunited these kindred concepts. (shrink)

The intuitive notion behind the usual semantics of most systems of modal logic is that of ?possible worlds?. Loosely speaking, an expression is necessary if and only if it holds in all possible worlds; it is possible if and only if it holds in some possible world. Of course, contradictory expressions turn out to hold in no possible worlds, and logically true expressions turn out to hold in every possible world. A method is presented for transforming standard modal systems into (...) systems of modal logic for impossible worlds. To each possible world there corresponds an impossible world such that an expression holds in the impossible world if and only if it does not hold in the possible world. One can then talk about such worlds quite consistently, and there seems to be no logical reason for excluding them from consideration. (shrink)

In the second chapter of The descent of man , Charles Darwin interrupted his discussion of the evolutionary origins of language to describe ten ways in which the formation of languages and of biological species were ‘curiously’ similar. I argue that these comparisons served mainly as analogies in which linguistic processes stood for aspects of biological evolution. Darwin used these analogies to recapitulate themes from On the origin of species , including common descent, genealogical classification, the struggle for existence, (...) and natural selection, among others. Skeptical of this interpretation, Gregory Radick sees the naturalistic account of language formation in the Descent comparisons as reinforcing Darwin’s idea that languages and the races of mankind have both undergone progressive development. Yet the details of Darwin’s language–species comparisons, as well as the polemical context in which they appear, show that they were not aimed at so limited a function. Rather, they addressed issues related to species transmutation in general. (shrink)

Conclusions reached using common sense reasoning from a set of premises are often subsequently revised when additional premises are added. Because we do not always accept previous conclusions in light of subsequent information, common sense reasoning is said to be nonmonotonic. But in the standard formal systems usually studied by logicians, if a conclusion follows from a set of premises, that same conclusion still follows no matter how the premise set is augmented; that is, the consequence relations of standard logics (...) are monotonic. Much recent research in AI has been devoted to the attempt to develop nonmonotonic logics. After some motivational material, we give four formal proofs that there can be no nonmonotonic consequence relation that is characterized by universal constraints on rational belief structures. In other words, a nonmonotonic consequence relation that corresponds to universal principles of rational belief is impossible. We show that the nonmonotonicity of common sense reasoning is a function of the way we use logic, not a function of the logic we use. We give several examples of how nonmonotonic reasoning systems may be based on monotonic logics. (shrink)

The idea that the world, not only of man but also of nature, was subject to a continuous process of change has taken strong root since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1859, Charles Darwin demonstrated that these changes were the result of immutable, eternal laws - although everything was subject to change, it was only in accordance with these laws. from the second half of the nineteenth century down to the First World War, this vision of change (...) and determination was interpreted in many different ways, both pessimistically and optimistically. It is striking that a fear of degeneration often went hand in hand with a belief in an upward evolutionary process and was not confined to any particular political spectrum. This volume, number XIV in the series, contains the papers presented at a workshop on the reception and interpretation of the theory of evolution, organised by the editors in April 2003. It covers the many, often irreconcilable faces, of the theory of evolution concerning not only the concrete substantive interpretation but also the many different fields of late nineteenth century thought by concentrating on cultural life in the broadest sense - political, social, scientific and artistic, both literature and the visual arts. This volume illustrates the versatility of the concept of evolution, and of degeneration as well, with the emphasis on the Netherlands. It not only presents the contradictions and many-sidedness of the post-Darwinian world, but also the continuity with the world before 1860. Moreover, it reveals one clear co-ordinating theme, namely that the theory of evolution was used as justification for many different ideologies and practices. (shrink)

Modern cells present no signs of a putative prebiotic RNA world. However, RNA coding is not a sine qua non for the accumulation of catalytic polypeptides. Thus, cellular proteins spontaneously fold into active structures that are resistant to proteolysis. The law of mass action suggests that binding domains are stabilized by specific interactions with their substrates. Random polypeptide synthesis in a prebiotic world has the potential to initially produce only a very small fraction of polypeptides that can fold spontaneously into (...) catalytic domains. However, that fraction can be enriched by proteolytic activities that destroy the unfolded polypeptides and regenerate amino acids that can be recycled into polypeptides. In this open system scenario the stable domains that accumulate and the chemical environment in which they are accumulated are linked through self coding of polypeptide structure. Such open polypeptide systems may have been the precursors to the cellular ribonucleoprotein (RNP) world that evolved subsequently. (shrink)

Dawkins in his The Selfish Gene(1) quite aptly applies the term “selfish” to parasitic repetitive DNA sequences endemic to eukaryotic genomes, especially vertebrates. Doolittle and Sapienza(2) as well as Orgel and Crick(3) enlivened this notion of selfish DNA with the identification of such repetitive sequences as remnants of mobile elements such as transposons. In addition, Orgel and Crick(3) associated parasitic DNA with a potential to outgrow their host genomes by propagating both vertically via conventional genome replication as well as infectiously (...) by horizontal gene transfer (HGT) to other genomes. Still later, Doolittle(4) speculated that unchecked HGT between unrelated genomes so complicates phylogeny that the conventional representation of a tree of life would have to be replaced by a thicket or a web of life.(4) In contrast, considerable data now show that reconstructions based on whole genome sequences are consistent with the conventional “tree of life”.(5–10) Here, we identify natural barriers that protect modern genome populations from the inroads of rampant HGT. BioEssays 27:741–747, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This study of the relationships of the concept of freedom to other allied notions is written from the libertarian point of view. It is based upon the author's Ph.D. dissertation at Emory University in 1962. While the present version is a revised and improved one, it remains somewhat narrow in the scope of historical materials used, concentrating on works available in English, and giving particular attention to Sir David Ross, Hastings Rashdall, C. A. Campbell, P. Nowell-Smith, and Charles Hartshorne. (...) The author locates freedom primarily in choice and argues that the key to choice-making is the ability actively to focus attention. Theories that argue for psychological determinism on the basis of motives are found to conflict with the phenomena of paying attention and trying. At the same time, Campbell's sharp distinction between the freedom of moral and non-moral choices is rejected, and also denied is the metaphysical grounding of freedom in a personality or self as agent distinct from the activity. The author is at his best in dealing with arguments of determinists concerning particular points; many of the distinctions and clarifications proposed are serious objections often overlooked by those defending determinism. Edwards is especially helpful in showing that determinist arguments generally assume universal determinacy of action on the ground of particular and/or partial determinacy, which libertarians need not deny. The examination of the relations between freedom and responsibility is intended to show that the "plain man's" views on moral responsibility cannot be adequately accounted for by a utilitarian theory of praise and blame and a determinist theory of action. The weakness of this study is its lack of an integrated metaphysical position. Thus, while Edwards rightly argues that nothing can be chosen unless it is first desired, he confusingly suggests that the function of choice is to supplement the strength of desires too weak to make themselves effective. An integrated metaphysical study might have raised questions about the commensurability of desires and goods. Again, the process-theory of agency is assumed too easily. Still, this is a useful study, and those interested in the problem will find much of value in it.--G. G. G. (shrink)

Most of us came into ecology with memories of special personal places. A cliff top that Claude Monet might have painted. Allen as a youth spent his holidays on the Dorset Coast near Swanage; he can still smell the sea breeze of his childhood. Curtin grow up on a farm in southwestern Wisconsin, the dew of the grass and the bright green on a June morning remains vivid. The catching of reptiles and insects for him awakened a curiosity about the (...) natural world that has remained to this day. But once into the field there came the scholarship. With ever tighter grant monies, the pressure to publish takes so much of the fun out of it. A climate of unbridled careerism prevails and shows itself in the incremental state of the literature: little things to list on this year's activities report. There are now even predatory journals that cynically do not seriously review submissions, and only collect page charges. As journal editors have a desperate time getting reviews done by mature scholars, instead of a hand off to their overworked graduate students. So what is to be done - how can we bring the joy and importance of discovery back into it all? After all ecology is done by human beings. Mostly it is a personal mission, for what great ecologists write is frequently personal and life changing. So an undercurrent of this book is to remind and reveal the original purpose of science. Not professional advancement, but the genuine search for novel ideas and the imperative to share hard won insights and personal passions. (shrink)

This essay posits that Peirce puts the Normative Sciences implicitly to work at three junctures of his Neglected Argument for the Reality of God (NARG): (1) in the distinguishing of musement from play; (2) in the generation of the Humble Argument via musement; and (3) in the portrayal of the Humble Argument as the first stage of an inquiry into its confirmability. Then, focus shifts to Peirce’s notions of the initiating “play” and the “plausibility” of the God-hypothesis, as a means (...) both to analyze and underscore the foundational role of esthetics in the Normative Sciences. After a discussion of the theological content of the argument, the essay concludes that Peirce did indeed employ the Normative Sciences as postulated, but that his truncation of NARG at the abductive stage renders the overall argument inconclusive, amounting more to a report of a religio-esthetic experience. (shrink)

The twelve contributors to Looking for Los Angeles focus on dramatic shifts in the urban landscape, important moments in the city's architectural history, and the role of the image in this mecca of image makers.